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Abstract
Information collection in political and judicial processes is often delegated
to several agents, each of whom is expected to defend a specific interest. This
paper provides a rationale for a striking feature of information collection in
such advocacy systems, namely that information collection is often sequen-
tial. If two agents search simultaneously, the incentive to continue searching
is affected by the information found by the other agent. Full information col-
lection then requires that the principal leaves rents to the agents. If agents
search sequentially, rewards can be made conditional on the information found
in earlier stages. Therefore, a sequential advocacy system reduces the rents
that agents receive. It comes, however, at the cost of either a more sluggish
decision-making process or less information collection.
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1 Introduction
In several organizations, agents are not expected to maximize the stated goals of
their organization. Rather, they have specific tasks. A typical example can be
found in courts. Trials are an instrument of getting the truth. However, it is not
the primary task of lawyers and prosecutors to get the truth. Lawyers are expected
to defend their clients, while prosecutors are expected to make cases against the
defendants. Another example of such an advocacy system can be found in politics.
We hope that the government promotes the public interest. Ministers, however,
have specific tasks. The minister of industry, for example, is not expected to defend
the environment. He is there to advocate the interest of industry.
Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), henceforth DT, provide an appealing rationale
for advocacy systems. They argue that advocacy systems facilitate guiding the
behavior of agents who are hired to collect information. The basic idea behind their
argument is as follows. Proper decision making often requires information on the
pros and cons of policy alternatives. The decision maker hires agents to collect
information. Because decisions are easier to verify than information, the decision
maker has to motivate agents by offering decision-based rewards. With decision-
based rewards, however, it is hard to motivate a single agent to search for both
the pros and cons of policy alternatives. The reason is that conflicting pieces of
information cancel each other out. From an agent’s perspective, having found no
information is equivalent to having found two pieces of conflicting information. An
advocacy system solves this problem. When one agent collects information on the
cons and another agent collects information on the pros, it is relatively easy to
provide the two agents incentives to search for information.1
This paper extends DT’s analysis to stress the importance of a striking feature of
advocacy systems. In advocacy systems, information collection is often sequential.2
A prominent example can be found in politics. Budgetary processes have a clear
1DT’s analysis can therefore been seen as an information rationale for adversarial legal systems.
Shin (1998) and Palumbo (2000) also compare the relative merits of adversarial and inquisitorial
legal systems.
2In some cases, information collection is sequential by nature. For instance, a prosecuting
attorney must have evidence before a case against a suspect can be made anyway, see e.g. Daughety
and Reinganum (2000). Our paper focuses on cases in which information collection can in principle
take place simultaneously as in DT.
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sequential nature. In most European countries, spending ministries first prepare
for the submission of their budget proposals. At this early stage of the budgetary
process, spending ministries are expected to be advocates of increased appropria-
tions (Von Hagen and Harden, 1994). As advocates, the spending ministries supply
information crucial to other agents in the process (Ott, 1993). At a later stage of the
budgetary process, the ministry of finance evaluates budget proposals. The ministry
of finance is expected to search for arguments for cuts in the budget proposals: it is
expected to be an advocate of decreased appropriations.
To provide an explanation for why information collection in advocacy systems
is often sequential, we augment the DT model by allowing the different pieces of
evidence to be found, and presented, at different moments in time. To capture this
feature of information collection processes, we divide the time available for collecting
information into two stages. The implication of this extension is twofold. First, since
rewards are decision-based, the discovery of evidence in favor of one cause at an early
stage affects the incentive of the other agent to continue collecting information at
a later stage. Full information collection requires that each agent has an incentive
to continue investigating her cause in period 2, when information about the other
cause has been found in period 1. We show that this forces the decision maker to
leave rents to the agents. Second, the extension enables us to analyze a sequential
advocacy system, in which one agent investigates her cause in the first stage, and the
other agent investigates her cause in the second stage. We show that a sequential
advocacy system reduces the rents agents receive. The reason is that a sequential
advocacy system enables the decision maker to offer the agent collecting information
in the second stage a decision-based reward scheme conditional on the information
found in the first stage. When sufficient time is available, a sequential advocacy
system yields full information collection and minimizes the rents left to the agents.
It comes, however, at the cost of a more sluggish decision-making process. When
time is limited, a sequential advocacy system eliminates rents but comes at the cost
of less information collection.
Apart from DT, our paper is related to several other papers. Milgrom and
Roberts (1986) identify the conditions under which interested agents supply private
information to a principal. They consider a situation where agents cannot manipu-
late information but can conceal it. They make a distinction between a sophisticated
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and an unsophisticated principal. A sophisticated principal understands the motives
of agents. He makes inferences from concealment of information. By assumption, an
unsophisticated principal becomes informed only if he actually receives information.
The existence of several interested agents with conflicting preferences increases the
likelihood that an unsophisticated principal receives information. Hence the princi-
pal benefits from the existence of several interested parties. An important difference
between our paper and that by Milgrom and Roberts is that in ours agents have to
exert costly effort to get information. A direct implication is that agents only look
for information if they want to supply it. Hence, in equilibrium information is never
concealed.
The collection of verifiable pieces of information is central in Rotemberg and
Saloner (1995). They study the role and origin of conflicts between the produc-
tion and the sales department of a firm. The firm has to choose between extending
existing production and the introduction of an additional product. The two depart-
ments disagree: the production department prefers extending production, while the
sales department favors the introduction of an additional product. Rotemberg and
Saloner show that when the firm is biased towards extending production, the sales
department first searches for evidence supporting the introduction of a new product.
Only if the sales department delivers evidence, the production department searches
for evidence in favor of extending production. The reason for this sequence is saving
on search costs. Without evidence in favor of the introduction of a new product,
the firm wants to extend production. Initially, the production department thus has
no incentive to search for information. In our paper there would also be an obvious
reason for sequential information collection if the decision to be made were binary.
Then, a decision maker inclined towards the status quo would want to be informed
first on the possible pros of a new project before asking an agent to search for the
cons. In this way, the decision maker reduces expected search costs.
Finally, there is a large literature on the transmission of information that can
be manipulated. Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that communication between a
sender and receiver of information improves when their preferences are more con-
gruent. Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001) examine how the order of speech affects the
aggregation of information from different experts. They consider a situation where
experts have the same preferences but different abilities. As experts care about their
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reputation, herding problems might occur. Our paper deviates from the cheap-talk
literature in that we assume that information cannot be manipulated.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Next, Section 3 presents
the optimal wage scheme under simultaneous information collection. Section 4 makes
the case for a sequential advocacy system. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
In DT, a decision maker makes one of three decisions: A, B and SQ. The decision
maker’s preferences depend on two independent parameters: θA ∈ {−1, 0} and
θB ∈ {0, 1}. Each parameter is equal to zero with probability 1 − α. Under full
information, the decision maker would choose decision A when θA + θB = −1,
decision B when θA + θB = 1, and SQ when θA + θB = 0.
To learn θA and θB, the decision maker can hire two agents. Each agent in-
vestigates one cause. To investigate a cause (i = A,B), each agent must incur
unverifiable disutility of effort K. We augment the DT model by splitting the time
available for research in two periods (t = 1, 2). The costs of investigating in period
1 and period 2 are denoted by K1 and K2 , respectively. If |θi| = 1 and Kt is
incurred, an agent learns nothing in period t with probability 1 − qt and obtains
hard evidence that |θi| = 1 with probability qt. If θi = 0, an agent cannot learn
anything. For simplicity, we assume that q = q1 = q2. Our assumptions have the
following consequences. If K1 is incurred, an agent finds evidence in period 1 with
probability x = αq. When an agent has not found evidence in period 1 and K2 is
incurred, he finds evidence in period 2 with probability xˆ = αˆq, where
αˆ =
α(1− q)
1− αq < α. (1)
At the end of period 2, the decision maker selects the decision. Like DT, we
make the following three assumptions. First, the decision A (B) is optimal if there
is evidence that θA = −1 (θB = 1), but there is no evidence that θB = 1 (θA = −1).
Second, decision SQ is optimal either if θA = −1 and θB = 1 or if no information
has been received. Third, K1 and K2 are sufficiently small, so that the benefits of
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investigating potentially exceed the costs of investigating.3 These three assumptions
ensure that the decision maker wants each agent always to investigate her cause, and
that the decision depends on the information supplied by the agents. In addition,
to reduce straightforward algebra we assume that K1 = K2 = K.
As in DT, the agents’ effort and pieces of evidence are unverifiable. As a conse-
quence, the organization has to rely on decision-contingent rewards. Even though
pieces of evidence are unverifiable, they are observable. Agents cannot forge or con-
ceal information. Agents are risk neutral and rewards are non-negative. Agent i, in
charge with cause i, receives wiI , if the decision maker selects I ∈ {A,B, SQ}.
3 The Optimal Wage Scheme
In DT, an advocacy system generates full information collection without abandoning
rents to the agents. This section shows that when information may become available
at different times full information collection implies that rents are abandoned to
agents.
We focus on one contract for two periods which is set at the beginning of period
1. We can show that offering a contract in period 2 conditional on the evidence
found in period 1 is not optimal. Then both agents would have an incentive to
postpone exerting effort to the second period.4
We first argue that in the augmented model, full information collection requires
that the contract must reward the agents when the decision maker selects status
quo. Suppose that in period 1, both agents have investigated their cause and that
agent i has found evidence in favor of cause i, while agent j has not found evidence
in favor of cause j. In this case, the decision maker chooses either status quo or
decision i. Full information collection requires that agent j prefers investigating to
3The first assumption requires that (1− αˇ)LI − αˇLE > 0, where αˇ is the posterior probability
that |θi| = 1 after two periods of searching, LI is the cost of choosing status quo when either A or
B is the efficient choice (inertia), and LE is the cost of choosing one of the causes when status quo
is the efficient choice (extremism). The second assumption implies that [1− 2αˇ(1− αˇ)]LE+ αˇ(1−
αˇ)(LM − 2LI) > 0 , where LM is the cost of choosing cause A when cause B is the efficient choice
or vice versa (misguided activism). This condition is satisfied if LM > 2LI . The third condition
requires that the total cost of information collection (which depends upon the incentive scheme
chosen) do not exceed the benefits of information. With full information collection, these benefits
are: 2LI [α(1− α)− α(1− q)(1− q)(1− x)(1− xˆ)(1− αˇ)]− xα(1− q)(1− q)2LE(2− q).
4The formal proof is provided in Appendix 1, see also footnote 6.
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not investigating in period 2. The incentive constraint is:
xˆwjSQ + (1− xˆ)wjI −K ≥ wjI . (2)
Clearly, as in DT, it is optimal for the decision maker to set wjI = 0.
5 Equation
(2), therefore, reduces to:
wjSQ =
K
xˆ
. (3)
Equation (3) implies that full investigation requires that the decision maker
must reward the agents when he selects status quo. The reason is obvious. Once
evidence has been found in favor of cause i, the decision moves away from decision
j. Consequently, if agent j were not rewarded for SQ and agent i has found evidence
in period 1, she would not have any incentive to investigate her cause in period 2.6
Let us now determine the lowest rewards that induce agent j to exert effort
in period 2, when neither agent has found evidence in period 1 and both agents
have exerted effort in period 1. Let β denote the probability that agent i chooses
investigating in period 2. When agent j chooses investigating, her expected utility
is:
£
βxˆ2 + β(1− xˆ)2 + (1− β)(1− xˆ)¤wjSQ + [βxˆ(1− xˆ) + (1− β)xˆ]wjJ −K
=
£
1− βxˆ+ 2βxˆ2 − xˆ¤wjSQ + xˆ(1− βxˆ)wjJ −K. (4)
When agent j chooses not investigating her expected utility is:
[(1− β) + β(1− xˆ)]wjSQ = (1− βxˆ)wjSQ. (5)
From (3), (4) and (5), it directly follows that the cost-minimizing reward scheme
5The nonliability constraint excludes wjI < 0.
6The decision maker could offer a new contract at the beginning of the second period when one
of the agents has found a piece of evidence in the first period. However, if agents cannot conceal
information, the opportunity to offer a new contract induces agents to postpone investigating to
the second period. See Appendix 1. Introducing a third agent would resolve this. Then, in period
1 the decision maker induces two agents to search after contrary goals without rewarding the status
quo. If one piece of evidence is found in period 1, a contract rewarding the status quo is offered to
a third agent, which yields full information collection. With dynamic increasing returns to effort,
however, it may be optimal to use two agents rather than three agents.
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that induces agent j to investigate her cause in period 2 is given by (3) and:
wjJ = 2
K
xˆ
. (6)
Because the model is symmetric, an analogous reward scheme applies to agent i.
We have derived the rewards that induce the agents to exert effort in period 2,
given that both agents have exerted effort in period 1. It is straightforward to verify
that (3) and (6) also induce both agents to investigate their cause in period 1. The
reason is that the cost of investigating are the same in period 1 and 2 (K1 = K2),
while the expected benefits of investigating are smaller in period 2 than in period 1
(αˆq = xˆ < x = αq).7
We can now calculate the rents each agent enjoys. Straightforward algebra shows
that each agent enjoys rents:
U j =
1− xˆ
xˆ
K − (1− x)K = [(x− xˆ) + (1− x)(1− xˆ)] K
xˆ
> 0. (7)
The cost-minimizing wage scheme abandons rents to the agents for two reasons.
The first reason is that agents must be rewarded for the status quo to induce them
to continue investigating their cause in the second period when one of the agents has
found evidence in the first period. Rewarding the status quo, however, introduces
the possibility of receiving a reward without exerting any effort. Hence, to induce
agents to exert effort, rents must be left. The second reason for leaving rents to
the agents is a declining probability of finding evidence over time. To induce an
agent to continue searching for two periods requires that rewards are based on the
posterior probability of finding evidence in period 2, which is lower than the prior
probability. Consequently, the rewards overcompensate for the cost of searching if
evidence is already found in the first period.
With two periods available for searching, an advocacy system abandons rents to
the agents also if agents can only provide information at the end of period 2 (so that
the first reason is not valid anymore). Then, analogous to DT, the decision maker
sets wiSQ = w
j
I = 0 (i 6= j) and wiI = K/ [xˆ(1− x)(1− xˆ)]. Each agent then enjoys
7The optimal contract given by (3) and (6) does not change if rewards are allowed to be
contingent on delay in decision-making. The formal proof is provided in Appendix 2.
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rents:
U j = (x− xˆ)K
xˆ
> 0. (8)
The difference between (7) and (8), which equals (1−x)(1−xˆ)K
xˆ
, gives the rents that
arise because agents must be induced to continue investigating when information
about one cause has become available.
4 The Case for Sequential Information Collection
In this Section we extend the model of Section 3 by allowing for the possibility that
the agents search for evidence in favor of their cause sequentially. For example, a
spending ministry first tries to find arguments for a higher budget. Subsequently,
the finance ministry searches for arguments for cuts in the budget proposed by the
spending minister. Finally, the Prime Minister (or the council of ministers) makes
the final budget decision.
Specifically, we assume that agent a investigates in period 1 and that agent b
investigates in period 2. We maintain the assumption of decision-based rewards.
However, the sequential setting enables the policy maker to condition agent b’s
rewards on the evidence found by agent a. As we will see below, the implication
is that for agent b the difference between decision-based rewards and information-
based rewards vanishes.
Let us first determine the cost-minimizing wage scheme for agent b. Two cases
have to be distinguished: (1) agent a has found evidence in favor of his case in period
1, and (2) agent a has not found evidence. In the former case, the decision moves
away from B. In the latter case, the decision moves away from A. The organization
can induce agent b to investigate by setting wbSQ = K/x and w
b
A = 0 when agent
a has found evidence in favor of his cause. It sets wbB = K/x and w
b
SQ = 0 when
agent a has not found evidence. These wage schemes induce agent b to exert effort,
without leaving rents.
In period 1, agent a prefers investigating to not investigating if:
£
x2 + (1− x)2¤waSQ + x(1− x)waA + x(1− x)waB −K ≥ (1− x)waSQ + xwaB (9)
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The left-hand side of (9) gives agent a’s expected reward when he chooses in-
vestigating. The right-hand side gives the expected reward when he chooses not
investigating. The cost-minimizing wage scheme that satisfies (9) is waB = w
a
SQ = 0
and waA = K/ [x(1− x)]. It is easy to show that this wage scheme fully extracts
agent a’s rents.
A comparison between the advocacy system of Section 3 and the sequential ad-
vocacy system shows that the former leaves rents to the agents, while the latter
does not. However, by nature, a sequential advocacy system does not induce full
investigation as each cause is investigated for only one period. When time is avail-
able, extending the search period easily solves this problem. For example, we can
allow agent a to search for information in period 1 and 2 and agent b to search
for information in period 3 and 4. As in Section 3, full information collection then
requires that the rewards to the agents depend on the posterior probabilities of find-
ing evidence rather than on the prior probabilities. Consequently, rents are left to
the agents.8 These rents are smaller than in Section 3, because rewards can be set
conditional upon the information found in earlier stages. The difference between (7)
and (8) gives the benefit of an extended sequential advocacy system relative to the
advocacy system of Section 3.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided a rationale for the sequential nature of information
collection in advocacy systems. Information about different causes may become
available at different times. When information collection takes place simultaneously
by different agents, the detection of evidence favoring a particular cause by one
agent affects the incentive of the other agent to continue collecting information in
favor of her cause. Full information collection then requires that rents are left to
the agents. A sequential advocacy system enables the decision maker to design a
reward scheme which fits with the information already found in earlier stages of
the information collection process by the other agent. This implies that a smaller
8It is worth noting that these rents also arise if rewards are directly based on the information
provided rather than on the decision. As above, rewards based on the moment of finding informa-
tion are not optimal as agents may either conceal information or postpone searching until the last
period.
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amount of rents needs to be abandoned to the information-collecting agents. A
sequential advocacy system is, therefore, cheaper than an advocacy system with
simultaneous information collection. However, it comes at the cost of either a more
sluggish decision-making process or less information collection. The choice between
a simultaneous and a sequential advocacy system thus ultimately entails a trade off
between the cost of information collection on the one hand, and the quality and/or
quick availability of information on the other hand.
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Appendix 1
In Section 3, we have focussed on one contract for two periods which is set at the
beginning of period 1. We have shown that the status quo must be rewarded and
hence rents are left to the agents. Offering a second contract in period 2 conditional
on the evidence found in period 1 seems a natural way to avoid leaving these rents.
In this Appendix we show that the possibility of a second contract induces agents
to postpone effort.
First we derive the contract offered in period 2 if only one piece of evidence
is found in period 1.9 Recall from Section 3 that to induce agent j to continue
searching, the decision maker sets wjI = 0 and:
wjSQ =
K
xˆ
(A1)
Let us now derive the contract offered to both agents at the beginning of period
1. Note that this contract applies for both periods in case no evidence is found in
period 1. We start with the second period. Suppose no evidence has been found in
period 1. To induce agent j to continue searching in period 2, the following incentive
constraint should hold:
β
£
xˆ(1− xˆ)wjJ + (1− xˆ)xˆwjI + xˆxˆwjSQ + (1− xˆ)(1− xˆ)wjSQ
¤
+(1− β) £xˆwjJ + (1− xˆ)wjSQ¤−K (A2)
≥ β £xˆwjI + (1− xˆ)wjSQ¤+ (1− β)wjSQ
where β denotes the probability that agent i chooses investigating in period 2.
Clearly, it is optimal for the decision maker to set wjI = w
j
SQ = 0. Hence, (A2)
reduces to:
wjJ =
K
xˆ(1− xˆ) (A3)
Is the reward as stated in (A3) sufficient to induce agent j to start searching at the
beginning of period 1? The total expected benefits for agent j of searching in both
9If two pieces of evidence are found, there is no reason for offering a second contract. If no
information is found, the initial contract is sufficient.
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period 1 and 2 are:
γ
£
x(1− x)(1− xˆ)wjJ + (1− x)xxˆwjSQ + (1− x)(1− x)xˆ(1− xˆ)wjJ
¤
+(1− γ) £x(1− x)wjJ + (1− x)xˆ(1− x)wjJ¤−K − (1− x)K (A4)
where wjSQ and w
j
J are defined by equation (A1) and (A3), respectively and γ denotes
the probability that agent i chooses investigating in period 1. The total expected
benefits for agent j of searching only in period 2 are:
γ
£
xxwjSQ + (1− x)(1− xˆ)xwjJ
¤
+ (1− γ)x(1− x)wjJ −K (A5)
After some straightforward algebra it follows from (A4) and (A5) that agent j has
an incentive to postpone exerting effort to the second period if:
γ
µ
x2
xˆ
¶
K > (1− γ)(1− x)
·
xˆ− x
1− xˆ
¸
K (A6)
Using xˆ < x, it is easy to see that this condition always holds. Hence, both
agents have an incentive to search only in the second period.
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Appendix 2
In this Appendix we show that when we allow for the possibility that rewards are
contingent on delay in decision-making, the optimal contract as stated in Section 3
does not alter.
Recall that the optimal contract with simultaneous advocacy is described by
wjSQ =
K
xˆ
, wjJ = 2
K
xˆ
and wjI = 0. To induce an agent who has not found evidence in
the first period to continue searching in the second period we must have wj,2SQ =
K
xˆ
as in Section 3 (the additional superscript refers to the moment of decision-making).
Moreover, when rewards are contingent on delay, it is still optimal to choosewjJ = 2
K
xˆ
as cause J is never chosen after one period of searching. Let us now derive wj,1SQ.
The expected benefits of searching in both period 1 and 2 for agent j are:
γ
 xxw
j,1
SQ + x(1− x)(1− xˆ)wjJ + x(1− x)xˆwj,2SQ ++(1− x)xxˆwj,2SQ
+(1− x)(1− x) £xˆxˆwj,2SQ + (1− xˆ)(1− xˆ)wj,2SQ + xˆ(1− xˆ)wjJ¤
 (A7)
+(1− γ)
 xxwj,2SQ + x(1− x)wjJ + (1− x)xˆ(1− x)wjJ
+(1− x)(1− xˆ)(1− x)wj,2SQ + (1− x)xˆxwj,2SQ
−K − (1− x)K
where γ denotes the probability that agent i chooses investigating in period 1 and
the rewards wj,2SQ and w
j
J are defined above. The expected benefits of searching only
in period 2 are:
γ
£
xxwj,2SQ + (1− x)(1− xˆ)xwjJ + (1− x)(1− xˆ)(1− x)wj,2SQ + (1− x)xˆxwj,2SQ
¤
+(1− γ) £xxwj,2SQ + (1− x)xwjJ + (1− x)(1− x)wj,2SQ¤−K (A8)
After some straightforward algebra, it follows that to induce agent j to search in
both periods the following should hold:
γxx
¡
wj,1SQ − wj,2SQ
¢ ≥ 0 (A9)
Clearly, costs are minimized by setting wj,1SQ = w
j,2
SQ =
K
xˆ
.
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